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A LOOK AT SCHOOL CHOICE IN SPAIN
ANA VILLARROYA
Abstract – This paper looks at how school choice policies implemented by the
Spanish government have functioned in practice. These changes, introduced in the
educational system during the eighties, included the introduction of a right to
enrol in any school funded by the public sector (public and private agreement
schools) and the establishment of a system of finance where user choice directs
government funds. The empirical research, focused on the Catalan community,
shows how providing public subsidies to private schools in order to ensure choice
has mostly benefited the middle classes. Payments for complementary and extra-
curricular activities, foundation contributions and uneven access to information
among different social groups have minimised the shift of pupils from the public
to the private agreement sector.
Introduction
he eighties brought the introduction of school choice policies to numerous
developed countries. With these policies, governments have attempted to extend
the opportunities for school choice to a wider section of the population. They have
also sought to increase the range of choices available, and thus to encourage
diversity and educational pluralism. Governments have also attempted to increase
parental participation in education and to create a new discipline in schools that
improves the quality of the services by allowing the better schools to attract more
customers and, therefore more resources.
The implementation of such policies has entailed the incorporation of market
logic in the delivery of educational services. In that sense, numerous governments
have aimed to enhance competition among schools, responsiveness to user
preferences, and efficiency in the process of educational delivery.
Often, policies designed for increasing school choice possibilities have gone
hand in hand with changes in processes for distributing pupils. Automatic
allocation to public schools closer at hand has been replaced by the freedom of
individuals to choose. Only in cases of oversubscribed schools do there still exist
criteria for allocating pupils across schools; the most widespread of which is the
closeness-to-home criterion. The implementation of these policies has also
involved the diffusion of information between parents and pupils. With this
measure, on the one hand, governments have pursued avoidance of benefits
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accruing to more privileged families – those with easiest access to information –
and, on the other hand, they have tried to encourage the use of academic criteria
in decision-making processes.
The level of effectiveness of these policies, like the way in which they have been
established, differs from one country to another. To a large extent most of the
evaluations of these policies come from the United Kingdom and are based on the
reforms introduced in the eighties in England and Wales.1 The UK experience and
that of other countries (basically the Netherlands and the United States)2 indicate
that in spite of the establishment of policies aimed to expand school choice
possibilities, most parents tend to choose the nearest school. Transport, children’s
desire to be with their friends, the cost of private schools where they are not subsidised,
and a bare minimum of ambitious expectations are determining factors involved in
choosing the closest school. Only in cases where there are specific reasons not to go to
the school nearest home (such as the lack of confidence in a particular school or
the preference for a special school), or in cases in which transport is made available
or governments finance private schools, have these policies made it easy to choose
an alternative school – at least for certain groups of users.
Measures to improve parents’ and pupils’ choice of school have also been
implemented in Spain. In the middle of the eighties the Spanish government
started to implement a range of measures aimed at making the freedom of school
choice effective. The aim of this article, then, is to look at the implementation of
such policies in Spain and the level of attainment of their objectives in practice. We
begin by describing the rules delimiting the freedom to choose a school in Spain.
The results of a qualitative analysis which will allow us to assess the extent to
which public funding for private schools in Spain has provided effective choice for
all users will then be presented. Finally, we consider the lessons that can be drawn
from this analysis, and their potential relevance for other communities.
Measures applied by the Spanish government to widen school
choice opportunities
The public-private choice is significant in Spain because around 30% of
primary and secondary pupils attend private schools, and because approximately
90% of these pupils attend private schools receiving government funds.
The size of the Spanish private sector and its capacity to influence policies such
as those related to subsidising private education can only be understood by
considering the historical specificities of the Spanish education system. Thus, one
of the most significant features of the Spanish education has been the
configuration of a dual education system, which before the arrival of democracy
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in the mid-seventies was the main basis for the inequality of educational
opportunities and results. While private schools (mostly religious) were able to
provide a good quality of education for more privileged families that could afford
school fees, children from poorer backgrounds attended low quality public
schools. When democracy arrived, the simultaneous process of economic crisis
and development of mass schooling in Spain forced successive governments to
take the private sector into account in defining educational policies.3
Article 27 of the 1978 Constitution establishes the main goals for the
development of a democratic education system. This article was the result of
difficult negotiation between left-wing and conservative political parties. While
left-wing parties had to assume a significant presence of publicly financed private
education, parents’ right to choose religious education for their children, and a
margin of parental choice of schools, the conservatives accepted some type of
control over the subsidised private sector, the non-compulsory character of
religion, teacher’s academic freedom and the participation of the educational
community in school decision-making (Bonal, 2000: 204).
Despite the constitutional consensus, article 27 left a significant margin for
interpretation in subsequent legislative developments. So, at first, the centrist
government interpreted article 27 in favour of private schools. Nevertheless, in
1985, as part of the 1985 Education Rights Act (Ley Orgánica del Derecho a la
Educación), the first socialist government replaced the previous policy of
indiscriminate public subsidies for private schools by a new system of agreements
(conciertos) between the public sector and private schools. In contrast to the
previous system, the new one currently in force consists in an agreement between
the two parties which sets up reciprocal rights and responsibilities relating to
economic requisites, length of time, deferment and extinction of the agreement.
Concerning the establishing of reciprocal rights and responsibilities between
the public sector and private schools, the public sector contributes to the funding
of private schools, applying the amount of money fixed for every classroom in the
public budget. This amount is annually determined in line with the level of the
running costs of the school to guarantee that education is imparted without charge.
The responsibilities of the schools include the following: they must provide free
education in the school level agreed, they must impart the courses specified in the
agreement, they must supply people with information about the economic status of
the school (if it is a private agreement school or not), they must respect all rules
established in matters of community participation in educational affairs, and they
must also people with optional, non-discriminatory and free complementary
activities4 and services.5
Through this system of agreements between the public sector and private
schools – agreements which presently finances around 75% of all private schools
24
at the primary and secondary level – the Spanish government sought to widen the
possibilities of school choice for all parents. In recent years, the Spanish
government has continued implementing measures to guarantee parents and
pupils the possibility of choosing schools outside the public sector. Among the
measures implemented, the following appear to us to be of special interest:
– The extension of the areas served by the schools financed by public funds
(public and private agreement schools). With this measure, introduced in 1997,
the Spanish government intended to increase educational supply and, therefore
the opportunities for parents and pupils to choose a school. This implies a
certain flexibility in the interpretation of the closeness-to-home criterion and
would allow parents and pupils to choose from among more than one school.
– The indiscriminate use of the family residence or the work place of either
parent in order to apply closeness-to-home criteria to allocate pupils in case of
oversubscribed schools. This measure, introduced for the first time in 1989,
represents the Spanish government’s attempt to introduce greater flexibility
into the school-to-home proximity criterion and to facilitate the schooling of
children.
– The possibility of primary education students applying to more than one
secondary school.
– The dissemination of information among users. The effectiveness of measures
designed to extend the range of choices available to parents will depend on the
information parents and pupils receive regarding the way school operates. To
this end, schools are obliged to inform parents and pupils about the contents of
their educational project, their policies, and their pedagogical characteristics.
The public sector is obliged to publish a list of those schools financed by public
funds (public and private agreement schools) located in each area. The list
must include the educational levels and services each school supplies. The
public sector is also obliged to ensure that information about schools is
objective and free of references to the cultural and socio-economic level of
families with children attending the school.
However, at present, the Spanish legislation contains some limiting factors of
school choice possibilities. Like the greater part of countries that have
implemented these kinds of policies, the main restriction on choice appears in
situations of excess demand. In these circumstances, two criteria determine
pupils’ admission in Spain: priority and complementary criteria. Priority criteria
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are closeness-to-home, family income and sibling enrolment in the same
school. After a period of comparison of the family income criterion to the
closeness-to-home criterion, new regulations currently in force prioritise
proximity of the school to the pupil’s home and the fact that a sibling attends
the same school.
The priority given to the closeness-to-home criterion, which has been criticised
in other countries, has also been questioned in the Spanish context. In that respect,
some criticisms focus on the perverse effects of these measures in limiting choice
to the nearest school. Others emphasise the fact that quality differs from area to
area and depends on factors intrinsic to the school rather than on the amount of
resources coming from the public sector. Finally, some other criticisms cite the
reduction in emphasis given to criteria of equity, especially of those related to
family income.
The Spanish system of admission also includes other elements that tend to
restrict the right of parents and pupils to enrol in any school. For example, schools
can determine complementary criteria. Besides the public sector,6 schools can
determine complementary criteria. Although these criteria should correspond to
objective, non-discriminatory, and outstanding circumstances, their application
restricts the freedom to choose, since it is up to the school to define these
circumstances, which in turn determine admission.7
Approach to school choice opportunities in a system
of publicly funded private education
This section presents a qualitative analysis,8 based on the views of a group of
school inspectors regarding the possibilities of school choice among the users of
compulsory education. The analysis is of an exploratory character and will be of
use in beginning to evaluate the level of effectiveness of the measures introduced
by the Spanish government to widen school choice possibilities. The importance
of this analysis lies, on the one hand, in the opportunity of having the views of a
group of experts and, on the other hand, in its potential for illuminating an area in
which the empirical evidence is limited. The principal restriction of the analysis
arises from the fact that it is not a representative sample and, hence its results
cannot be generalised to apply to all of Spain, where the differences in powers
transferred to the autonomous regions and the idiosyncrasy of each region have led
to differences in the implementation of the system of agreements within the
private sector.9
The results of the qualitative analysis, which is presented below, have been
systematised in thematic blocks.
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1. Reasons for choosing a school
As in other countries that have implemented school choice policies, in a context of
competition for students, the behaviour of a school depends, to a great extent, on
the criteria used by parents to decide which school their children will attend.
With the purpose of ascertaining the criteria that the Catalan community apply
in choosing a school, the questionnaire contained a set of questions addressed to
the choice of parents and pupils. The majority of school inspectors agreed that the
main criteria for decision-making are situational (i.e. outside the school’s control)
as, for example, the proximity of the school to the home, or the desire to go to the
same school as one’s neighbours and friends. In addition to these factors, school
inspectors pointed out that parents usually choose schools taking into account the
physical aspects of the school or the fact that access to it is difficult. Thus, if it is
difficult to obtain access, parents conclude that it is a ‘good’ school. In relation to
the image and reputation of schools, inspectors pointed out that the determining
factor is more the opinion of people living in the area than the image the centre
itself attempts to promote.
As to underlying reasons for the decision for choosing a private agreement
school, numerous school inspectors mentioned the importance of ‘environmental’
factors, such as discipline and safety inside the school, the extent of the timetable
(including extra-curricular activities), familiar treatment, continuity in the
educational itinerary (i.e. the possibility of attending the same school at both
primary and secondary levels), the school’s atmosphere, certain social or
ideological (religious) differentiation, the socio-economic status of other pupils
attending the school, social expectations, family tradition, and the prestige
involved in paying a certain amount of money.
Social expectations and the socio-economic status of pupils are reasons that
influence the choice of private agreement schools, for both high and low income
groups. Low income groups usually believe that enrolling their children in schools
in the private agreement sector (something that very frequently involves the
payment of certain sums of money) offers guarantees that are absent in public
schools. In that sense, families with higher incomes in poor areas prefer to enrol
their children in private agreement schools because that gives them an opportunity
to leave the area and also to protect their children from ‘bad influences’.
Interviewees also stated the limited interest of parents in the school project, in
curricular subjects, in pedagogical techniques applied by the school, or in other
kinds of considerations related to the performance of the school. The most
immediate consequence, then, is that parents and children rarely choose schools
on the basis of well-informed comparisons of educational quality. The limited
importance of educational criteria in the decision of which school to send their
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children to corroborates the conclusions of studies undertaken in other countries
regarding the reasons which usually determine school choice.10
2. The impact of public funding of private education on the school choice
possibilities of parents and pupils
With the aim of finding out if the system of agreements, established in 1985, has
increased school choice possibilities of all users of compulsory education or
whether, on the contrary, it has benefited the most privileged, the questionnaire
included a set of questions about the effects of this system in practice.
Almost all school inspectors agreed that the system of subsidies to private schools
has mostly benefited the middle classes.11 This is due to the fact that higher income
groups would have continued enrolling their children in private schools, irrespective
of whether private schools were financed by the public sector, and lower income
groups in most cases continue to be unable to enrol their children in these schools,
despite the fact that they are subsidised. In that sense, it is possible to conclude that
the processes of choice are to some extent related to social class.
There are other studies in Spain which point in the same direction. This is the
case of the analysis undertaken by Molina & Jaen (1993), Calero & Bonal (1999),
or Villarroya (2000) about the distributive incidence of public expenditure in
private schools. From quantitative approaches, they reach the same conclusion:
subsides channelled to private schools have mostly benefited the better off.
The system of agreements with the private sector, then, has not removed all
barriers to the access to private schools and, therefore low income groups have
continued, in most cases, limiting their choices to the public sector. The payment
for complementary and extra-curricular activities, foundation contributions or the
easiest access to information of higher income groups make entry to private
agreement schools specially difficult for lower income groups. Consequently, it is
possible to conclude that the system of agreements with the private sector has not
involved an important shift from pupils enrolled in the public sector to the private.
Many school inspectors also pointed out the identification that low income
groups usually make between private agreement schools and fee-paying schools.
These groups usually have a mistaken perception of the reality of the situation
because of their lack of information about the fact that education is free in private
agreement schools and complementary activities and foundation contributions
have a voluntary character.
Some school inspectors pointed out the fact that in some locations the decrease
in birth rate has increased the real possibilities of choosing a school. These
demographic changes have thus, in many cases, affected schools’ behaviour as
they now have to compete to attract students.
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3. Effects of the expansion of the areas served by the schools on the school
choice opportunities of parents and pupils
One of the measures introduced by the Spanish government to increase school
choice possibilities was the expansion of the areas served by the schools financed
by public funds (public and private agreement schools). Through the definition of
areas, which is re-examined each year by the local authorities, school inspectors
and the schools themselves, the public sector plans the educational services
for each area and introduces criteria to allocate pupils in case of oversubscribed
schools.
There were different opinions about the effects that the expansion of the areas
served by the schools can have on the school choice opportunities of parents and
pupils. On the one hand, some inspectors stated that the definition of areas is a
limit per se to the freedom of parents and pupils to choose a school, since they see
their choice restricted by the area. This definition by area can also increase social
segregation; cases of excess demand where choices are reduced to the nearest
school reproduce the socio-economic segregation of population. On the other
hand, some inspectors pointed out that the true limits of a school stem from the
demand of the school, since zoning criteria apply only in cases of excess demand.
The expansion of areas in these cases entails a loss of weight of the proximity-to-
home criterion and, therefore a revaluation of the remaining criteria. Finally, other
groups of school inspectors maintained that the expansion of areas mostly benefits
those parents that can cover transport and food expenses and, hence those families
with higher income levels.
4. Information provided by schools
One of the principal limiting factors of the choice opportunities is that parents and
pupils have no access to cheap and accurate information. Most of the interviewees
stated that information about schools is insufficient and unevenly distributed
among social groups. They also pointed out that information is mostly based on
rumours and not on objective assessments about the quality of teaching or about
the academic results of the school. In these cases, information is distributed among
users through indirect channels, such as, conversations with neighbours, friends or
relatives.
About the information provided by schools, many of the school inspectors
interviewed indicated that for many years some private schools have frequently
failed to divulge their subsidised status in order to get money from the families by
charging school fees. At present, and mainly as a result of the decrease in the birth
rate, the vast majority of schools inform users about their subsidised character,
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given the positive effects of this for attracting pupils. However, information about
the specific conditions of the agreement, such as the educational levels agreed or
the approved amount of fees in the case of complementary and extra-curricular
activities, continues to be inadequate.
In general, we can conclude that information supplied by schools is insufficient.
Schools rarely inform families about the voluntary nature of complementary
activities and foundation contributions. Such concealment allows schools to
obtain monthly income from almost all families with children attending the
school. Moreover, schools usually do not inform families regarding what they are
paying; in general, they give parents the overall amounts, without specifying the
different types of expenses. In relation to admission rules, many schools do not
provide adequate publicity on extra places, which means that access is restricted
to a privileged group of users.
In recent years, the public sector has conducted an active publicity campaign
addressed to the schools, insisting on the obligatory nature of informing parents
about the voluntary character of complementary activities and foundation
contributions.
5. Information used by parents and pupils
In spite of the campaigns conducted by the public sector of late, the information
that parents and pupils have at their disposal is insufficient and is unevenly
distributed among different social groups.
It is true that the prescriptive information – such as the period of matriculation
in schools financed by public funds, or a list with all schools financed by public
funds located in each area – is distributed among the entire population. However,
due to their condition as a social class, not all social groups gather information
in the same way. Thus, groups with a higher socio-cultural level have better
access to information, an easier understanding and interpretation of that
information, and are consequently better placed to take advantage of those
additional choices that are, theoretically, open to all. In contrast, families with
lower socio-cultural levels basically put their trust in the information provided
by neighbours, friends or relatives. The majority of these families are acquainted
with private agreement schools, but tend to identify them with fee-paying
schools. But private agreement schools also exist in poor areas, where most of
these schools are religious and where the families who most frequently send
their children to these schools are among the highest income group in that area.
In general, the subsidised schools in poor areas are frequently similar to the
public ones, with regard to customers, facilities and the extremely low amount
of payments for complementary activities.
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As a general rule, the vast majority of families are unaware of the voluntary
nature of complementary and foundation contributions. This ignorance spreads
among all social groups, so that the identification between private agreement
schools and fee-paying schools is equally common among the entire population.
6. Restrictive factors of the school choice capacity of parents and pupils
There is a range of factors that limit the choice opportunities of parents and pupils.
Most of these factors are economic and are especially likely to limit the choice of
low income groups, who see a reduction in their opportunities of gaining access to
private agreement schools. Some of these factors are the result of activities of
doubtful legality; this includes the collection of money for reserving places,
payments for matriculation, or payments for covering heating expenses or other
running costs, as well as the payments for the expansion of the school or for the
implementation of new programs. These practices are increasingly less frequent
but they remain an indirect source of funding for the schools, and make it more
difficult for certain groups to obtain access to them.
In regard to the principal economic factors, inside the legal framework, and
which also limit the possibilities of choosing private agreement schools, most of
the school inspectors interviewed mentioned the collection of money for
complementary activities and foundation contributions. Concerning the schools
that have become foundations, which are the majority, school inspectors pointed
out the fact that they usually receive monthly payments from the families whose
children attend them and a certain amount of money deposited when the child
enters the school that may be returned when he/she leaves the school. In spite of
the voluntary character of both contributions, they still remain as two of the main
obstacles to lower income groups’ access to these schools, since parents are
ignorant of the voluntary nature of both payments.11
In addition to these practices, private agreement schools have developed
another set of mechanisms which allows them to obtain income from the
families and which also contributes to the identification of private agreement
with fee-paying schools. Mechanisms of this sort include payments for extra-
curricular activities, for complementary services or for teaching materials.
Regarding this issue, most interviewees pointed out that the kind of extra-
curricular activities and teaching materials differ among private agreement
schools, the differentiation frequently being due to the population attending the
school. Thus, the kind of activities, teaching materials or their payments differs
according to the area. In well-off areas, for example, the payments for
complementary or extra-curricular activities are higher than in more deprived
areas. In the latter, the conditions in private agreement schools are similar to
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the conditions established for public schools located in the same area. In
contrast, the differences between private and public schools are usually greater
in well-off areas.
There also exists another set of restrictive factors, some of which arise from the
local conditions, such as when there is only one school in the locality. Others arise
from the structures of the educational system, such as the fee-paying status of the
pre-school education or the excess demand in certain schools.
Concluding comments
This paper has1 looked at how school choice policies implemented by the
Spanish government have functioned in practice. As in other countries, the
changes introduced by the Spanish government in the educational system during
the eighties included the introduction of a right to enrol in any school funded by
the public sector (public and private agreement schools) and the establishment of
a system of finance where user choice directs government funds.
But the Spanish education system has certain particularities. On the one hand,
Spain has a long tradition of shared public and private provision of education, and
this has resulted in a comparatively large number of private schools. At present,
30% of pupils at primary and secondary levels attend private schools in Spain. On
the other hand, most private schools (around 65% of private agreement schools)
are run by Catholic organisations, which have played a key role in the evolution of
educational policy in Spain.
Both features are especially relevant in the Catalan region, where the nationalist
party has clearly developed an educational policy to protect the private education
system (Calero & Bonal, 1999). This protection has led to a growing flow of public
resources to the private sector, which has been discussed at length from more
progressive positions (see Villarroya, 2000).
The evidence, focused on the Catalan region, has clearly indicated that
providing public subsidies to private schools in order to ensure choice has mostly
benefited the middle classes. Payments for complementary and extra-curricular
activities, foundation contributions and uneven access to information among
different social groups have minimised the shift of pupils from the public to the
private agreement sector. These results have also been corroborated by other
studies, so analyses of the distributive incidence of public expenditure on private
schools show a privileged position of the middle class respect to other groups (see
Molina & Jaen, 1993; Calero & Bonal, 1999 and Villarroya, 2000).
This analysis has also pointed out how the effects of demographic changes,
which have been especially notable in recent years, have caused a change in the
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behaviour of schools, which in certain localities now have to compete to attract
students, thus increasing the choice available to parents and pupils.
Concerning the factors that mostly determine the choices open to parents and
pupils, this analysis has shown, on the one hand, the diversity of opinions about the
effects of the extension of the areas served by the schools on the choice
possibilities of users. There are those who consider that zoning is a limit per se to
the freedom of users to choose a school, since they see the opportunities available
to them restricted by the closeness-to-home criterion. There are also those who
think that this extension implies a loss of weight in the closeness-to-home criterion
and, hence a revaluation of the rest of the criteria involved. On the other hand,
most school inspectors interviewed agreed that inadequate information is one of
the key factors that constrains the exercise of choice. Information about schools is
insufficient and unequally distributed among social groups. In general, schools do
not inform families about the voluntary nature of complementary activities and
foundation contributions, or about the number of extra places. In addition to the
economic limits, there exists another set of restrictive factors, some of which arise
from the local conditions, such as when there is only one school in the locality.
Others arise from the structures of the educational system, such as the fee-paying
status of the pre-school education or the excess demand in certain schools.
Consequently, we conclude that policies for increasing school choice in Spain
have brought risks as well as opportunities. The analysis of these results, although
limited to the Catalan community, shows how public controls need to be
introduced in order to deal efficiently and equitably with the present system.
Notes
1. See, among others, the following studies: Ball (1993), Gewirtz et al. (1995), Walford (1993, 1996,
2000, 2001), Bowe et al. (1994a, 1994b), Glatter & Woods (1994), Ball et al. (1996), Ambler
(1997), West & Pennell (1997), Whitty (1997), Williams (1997), and Whitty & Edwards (1998).
2. With regard to this see, among others, the following studies: James (1991a, b), Edwards & Whitty
(1992), OECD (1994), Ambler (1997), Lodewijks (1997), Louis & van Velzen (1997), Ritzen et
al. (1997), Sturm et al. (1998), Karsten (1999), Vijlder (2000), Walford (2000, 2001) and Dronkers
et al. (2001).
3. See Bonal & Rambla (1996), Calero & Bonal (1999), and Bonal (2000) for a detailed analysis of
the contemporary Spanish education policy and the role played by educational interest groups.
4. According to the Spanish regulations, complementary activities have a voluntary character, have
to be imparted within school hours, have to contribute to the attainment of the educational aims
and the charging of any amount of money for these activities needs to be authorised by the
educational authorities. Extra-curricular activities also have a voluntary character, but they have
to be carried out outside school hours, have to deal with non-curricular subjects, and the amount
of money involved must be made known to the educational authorities.
5. According to the Spanish regulations, complementary services are, for example, transport, food,
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and medical and psychological services. The charging of money for these services has also to be
authorised by the educational authorities.
  6. The criteria fixed by the public sector include the following: belonging to a large family, having
persons with special needs, taking care of parents, coming from a school that is about to close, etc.
  7. Some of the criteria fixed by the schools are: having studied in the school or having chosen the
school as a first option.
  8. The principal features of the chosen methodology are the following:
– A qualitative approach was applied. This methodology allows, among other aspects, the
description and identification of especially complex social phenomena and the identification of
unforeseeable consequences or weaknesses and conflicts inherent in the design and application of
school choice policies.
– The sample consisted of twenty-one school inspectors distributed in different places of the Catalan
autonomous region.
– The method employed for data collection was a specific type of interview, the elite interview
(Marshall & Rossman, 1995). This specialised form of interview consists in interviewing especially
well-informed individuals or groups selected for their experience in areas that are relevant to the
research. In this case, school inspectors have the responsibility of ensuring that regulations are
fulfilled and that the members of the community are informed as to their rights and responsibilities.
– The principal advantage of this type of interview lies in the opportunity of collecting valuable
information that ensures the quality of data and the credibility of the study. Interviews were organised
in thematic blocks by means of a questionnaire. The format of questions was open and the format of
answers was not structured. The average period of interviews was one hour and the interviews were
conducted from February to October of 1998. The first were pilot interviews, which allowed
modification and removal of those questions that seemed to generate little data for the research.
– The data-collection method applied was to take notes during the interview. The advantage of this
technique is that it allows an increase in the comfort of the interviewee and the rapidity of data
transcription (see Saran, 1988; Bryman & Burgess, 1994a, b; Kvale, 1996).
– The method of analysis involved, firstly, organisation of data by means of consecutive readings;
secondly, data transcription and systematisation in thematic blocks and, finally, the writing up of
results and the preparation of commentary on results. In that sense, see Ritchie & Spencer (1994),
and Marshall & Rossman (1995).
  9. The case of the Catalan autonomous region is especially interesting since the private sector has a
significant presence in education (around 40% of primary and secondary pupils attend private
schools). This is a result of the conservative ideology of the nationalist government and the existence
of powerful organizations defending private interest (Calero & Bonal, 1999; Bonal, 2000).
10. With regard to this see Edwards et al. (1989), Edwards & Whitty (1992).
11. Analyses applied to Anglo-Saxon countries tend to support the hypothesis about the privileged
position of the middle classes in the operations of the welfare state (Goodin & Le Grand, 1987;
Boyd-Barret, 1995).
12. These opinions have recently been corroborated by a report undertaken by the School Inspection
Body on the Catalan community. From a quantitative perspective, Villarroya (2000) shows how
private agreement schools still receive an important part of their funds from parents in spite of the
public resources channelled to these centres.
Ana Villarroya teaches at the Department of Political Economy and Public Finance,
Faculty of Economics, University of Barcelona. E-mail address: avilla@eco.ub.es
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